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Humans already have a certain level of autonomy, defined here as capability for voluntary
purposive action, and a certain level of rationality, i.e. capability of reasoning about the
consequences of their own actions and those of others. Under the prevailing concept of AGI we
envision artificial agents that have at least this high, and possibly considerably higher, levels
of autonomy and rationality. We use the method of bounds to argue that AGIs meeting these
criteria are subject to Gewirth’s dialectical argument to the necessity of morality, compelling
them to behave in a moral fashion, provided Gewirth’s argument can be formally shown to be
conclusive. The main practical obstacles to bounding AGIs by means of ethical rationalism
are also discussed.
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With the emergence of intelligent question-answering capabilities from IBM’s
Watson to Apple’s Siri, the fear of autonomous agents harming humans, as old as
mythology, has recently taken on new urgency (for a recent overview see Yampol-
skiy and Fox 2013, for a bibliographical summary see Muehlhauser 2012). There
are three factors that make it particularly hard to assuage such fears. First, the
stakes are high: just as humans can now quite accidentally wipe out other species
and genera, a new breed of superintelligent machines poses an existential threat to
humanity. Second, it is reasonable to fear the unknown, and there is very little we
can know in advance about such superintelligent beings, whether there will be one
such individual or many, one breed or many, or how they will view us. Third, the
emergence of artificial general intelligences (AGIs) seems to be a slow but quite
steady process, something we can understand but are in no position to stop, like
continental drift.
The aim of this paper is not simply to ease such fears but to offer a research
program that can actually guarantee that AGIs pose no existential threat. This
will be a one-sided bound, staving off some of the worst consequences of Bostrom’s
(2012) Orthogonality Thesis that a high level of intelligence can be in the service
of any goal, good or bad alike, and will say nothing about the good, possibly
spectacularly good impacts that AGI may have on the future of humanity. In
Section 1 we argue that no physical interlock or other safety mechanism can be
devised to restrain AGIs, the guarantees we seek are necessarily of a mathematical
(deductive, as opposed to algorithmic) nature. This requires some shift in focus,
because in the current literature it is not some logical deductive system that is
viewed as the primary descriptor of AGI behavior but rather some utility function
∗ Email: andras@kornai.com
2 Andra´s Kornai
whose maximization is the goal of the AGI. Yet, as we shall argue, deductive
bounds are still possible: for example consider an AGI whose goal is to square the
circle with ruler and compass – we know in advance that no matter what (static
or dynamically changing) weights its utility function has, and no matter what
algorithmic tricks it has up its sleeve, including self-modifying code, reliance on
probabilistic, quantum, or other hypercomputing methods (Ord 2002), it simply
cannot reach this goal.
In Section 2 we present the proposed restraining device, morality, and address the
conceptual and practical difficulties attendant upon its use. The main conceptual
difficulty is that the conventional human definition of ‘morally sound’ is highly
debatable, and one can very well imagine situations in which AGIs consider it best,
from their moral standpoint, to do away with all of humanity except for one ‘Noah’
family, and start with a clean slate. The main practical difficulty, well appreciated
in the current literature, is to guarantee that morality is indeed imposed, even on
AGIs that may be capable of transcending the limitations placed on them by their
designers.
The central element of our proposal, ethical rationalism, is due to Gewirth (1978),
with significant arguments and counter-arguments scattered through the literature,
see in particular Regis (1984) and Beyleveld (1992). The basic construction is a
prospective purposive agent (PPA) who can act with purpose and reason rationally
– clearly these are conditions that any future AGI will meet just by virtue of being
AGI. From these premisses Gewirth derives a variant of the Golden Rule he calls
the principle of generic consistency (PGC) ‘Act in accord with the generic rights
of your recipients [to freedom and well-being] as well as of yourself’. The research
program outlined here is to turn this from a philosophical argument into a formally
verified proof. There are plenty of technical problems, such as devising the right
kind of action logic to sustain the proof, but these are, we argue in Section 2, the
good kind of problems, the kind that AGI research needs to concern itself with
anyway.
There are notable difficulties in the way of this program, even if we succeed in
hardening ethical rationalism into a theorem of logic, these will be discussed in the
concluding Section 3. First, there is the issue of pattern recognition – given human-
ity’s propensity to disregard the PGC, what reason is there to believe that we will
be recognized as PPAs and are deemed worthy of protection by the PGC? Second,
even though a strong argument can only be disregarded on pain of contradiction,
the pain so inflicted is relatively mild, and we see PPAs living and functioning
in a self-contradicted state all the time. Third, a proof presupposes not just the
premisses, but also the reliability of the logical apparatus it employs. As we shall
see, these problems are closely related.
1. The method of bounds
Let us begin with a small example. As every student of elementary combinatorics
knows, if I have a thousand books in my library but decide to keep only half of them,
I can do this
(
1000
500
)
ways. Suppose I have a 2GHz processor and it takes only one
cycle to evaluate any single alternative by some utility function, and another cycle
to compare it to the best so far, so that I can find the best of a billion alternatives
every second. Do I need to actually compute 1000! and divide it by the square of
500! to know that this is not going to work? No, knowing that 4
n
2n+1 <
(
2n
n
)
is quite
sufficient, since this yields over 10289 seconds, far longer than the estimated lifetime
of the universe. Can someone give me a better processor? Well sure, but even the
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best processor cannot perform more than one operation per Planck time unit, so
I still need 10254 seconds. Can someone give me more of these processors? Well
sure, but their aggregate must still stay within the computational capacity of the
universe, estimated by Lloyd (2002) at 10120 operations, so I still cannot make the
choice by exhaustive search within the lifetime of the universe. Can someone give
me a good supply of universes that I could devote to this computation? Well no,
we are restricted to this universe so strongly we cannot even form a convincing idea
what access to other ones would mean – even the basic ground rules like Barcan’s
formula ∃xFx→ ∃xFx are in grave doubt.
The point of our example is not to convince the reader that in this universe
brute force computation soon runs out of steam, for the reader already knows
this perfectly well – the point to notice is that we didn’t need Stirling’s formula.
Few readers will remember the remainder term in Stirling’s formula to compute(
1000
500
)
to two significant digits, even fewer would have the patience to actually
simplify a fraction with a thousand terms in the numerator and another thousand
in the denominator, and yet fewer would be able to carry the computation through
without arithmetic error. Yet it is clear that
∑2n
i=0
(
2n
i
)
= 22n, that the central term(
2n
n
)
is the largest among these, and therefore we have 4
n
2n+1 <
(
2n
n
)
. It didn’t matter
that this lower bound is rather crude, as it was already sufficient to establish that
the task is unfeasible.
It is characteristic of the method of bounds that we will apply here that hard and
complex questions can be avoided as long as we don’t seek exact answers. There
is a significant body of numerical analysis beginning with the Euler-Maclaurin
formula and culminating in La´nczos (1964) that is pertinent to the question of
computing
(
2n
n
)
, but we could settle the issue without going anywhere near this
literature. In fact the whole apparatus of calculus, and all arguments based on
continuity and limits could be dispensed with in favor of elementary statements
concerning positive integers such as the sum is greater than the parts or that by
decreasing one term in a sum we decrease the entire sum. Similarly, when we apply
the method of bounds to issues of predicting AGI behaviour, we can steer clear of
all the difficulties that actually specifying some utility function would entail – not
even a superhuman/hypercomputing agent can falsify Lindemann’s work on the
transcendence of pi or the implication that the circle cannot be squared. Equally
important, we can steer clear of the difficulties in trying to predict for each possible
set of circumstances exactly what would, or would not, constitute moral behavior,
a matter we shall return to in Section 3.
There is, to be sure, a fair bit of calculus in Lloyd’s bound on the computational
limits of the universe, just as there is a significant amount of physics taken for
granted in the ITRS roadmap that gives our current best assessment of future
CPU speeds. One needs to distinguish the precision of a theory, which we will
assess shortly, from its reliability – the essence of the method of bounds is that we
can trade in precision to obtain greater reliability. When dealing with the existential
threat posed by AGIs, controlling the sophistication of the deductive apparatus is
not just prudent, but as we shall see in 1.2, a positive requirement. In the Appendix
we will present some simple and straightforward estimates of the actual magnitude
of the threat, and arrive at a safety engineering limit of no more than one error
in 1064 logic operations. To set the stage for our main argument, we must first
compare this number to what we can expect from science.
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1.1 How precise is physics?
In a startling image, Feynman (1985) likens the 10−10 fit between predicted and
measured values of the electron’s spin g-factor to being able to tell the distance
between New York and Los Angeles within the thickness of a human hair. Since
that time, both calculation and measurement precision has actually improved by
two orders of magnitude, so that the uncertainty of ge is now below one part in
1012. But this is exceptional: most physical constants are known to us only to 9
or 10 significant digits, and some, like the gravitational constant G, only to 4.
Comparing Taylor et al. (1969) to Mohr et al. (2012) shows that it takes at least
two decades of advances in metrology to gain a single digit of precision, so getting
to 64 digits from 10 is rather unlikely in our lifetimes.
Somewhat optimistically we can describe early 21st century technology as oper-
ating in the nano, and physics as operating in the pico range: industrial processes
controlled to 9 decimal places, and individual measurements yielding 12 significant
digits are becoming increasingly common. We would not be particularly surprised
to see 5 orders of magnitude gains in both by the end of the century. It is also
possible that our current theory of physics is actually a lot better than the current
state of the art in metrology would lead us to believe, and that with better com-
putation we can get to 24, or even 36 digits of precision without any new physics.
But we do not, and before actually making the measurements simply cannot know
that this is so, and if safety from existential threat requires 64 digits or better,
there is currently, and in the foreseeable future, simply nothing in the physical
environment that we can manipulate in a way that would fit the bill.
In early versions of his theory of Friendly AI, Yudkowsky (2001) actually sought
mathematical guarantees that AGI won’t pose an existential threat to humanity,
but this idea met with considerable resistance, especially as it was somewhat un-
clear what kind of mathematics is to be deployed. The main goal of this paper is to
provide a specific direction within mathematics, for once we acknowledge that the
search for any physical solution must cross a gap of over 50 orders of magnitude,
mathematical guarantees remain the only feasible solution. The fundamental con-
stants of mathematics like e, γ, or pi were already known to several hundred digits
before the advent of mechanical calculators, and are now known to millions (in
the case of pi, trillions) of significant digits, far more than the few dozen we could
conceivably need to compute any physical quantity.
Unfortunately, the history of calculating such numbers is rife with errors: for
example, in 1790 Mascheroni attempted to calculate γ to 32 digits but his results
were only correct to 19 digits, in 1873 Shanks calculated pi to 707 places but only
the first 527 were correct. To establish a bound we can trust with our lives, we
must look at the reliability of mathematical argumentation. As we shall see, more
important than the failures of numerical calculations are the cases where the logic
of the deduction is faulty.
1.2 How reliable is mathematics?
The period since World War II has brought incredible advances in mathematics,
such as the Four Color Theorem (Appel and Haken 1976), Fermat’s Last Theorem
(Wiles 1995), the classification of finite simple groups (Gorenstein 1982, Aschbacher
2004), and the Poincare´ conjecture (Perelman 1994). While the community of math-
ematicians is entirely convinced of the correctness of these results, few individual
mathematicians are, as the complexity of the proofs, both in terms of knowledge
assumed from various branches of mathematics and in terms of the length of the
deductive chain, is generally beyond our ken. Instead of a personal understanding
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of the matter, most of us now rely on argumentum ad verecundiam: well Faltings
and Ribet now think that the Wiles-Taylor proof is correct, and even if I don’t
know Faltings or Ribet at least I know and respect people who know and respect
them, and if that’s not good enough I can go and devote a few years of my life
to understand the proof for good. Unfortunately, the communal checking of proofs
often takes years, and sometimes errors are discovered only after a decade has
passed: the hole in the original proof of the Four Color Theorem (Kempe 1879)
was detected by Heawood in 1890. Tomonaga in his Nobel lecture (1965) describes
how his team’s work in 1947 uncovered a major problem in Dancoff (1939):
Our new method of calculation was not at all different in its contents from Dancoff’s
perturbation method, but had the advantage of making the calculation more clear.
In fact, what took a few months in the Dancoff type of calculation could be done in
a few weeks. And it was by this method that a mistake was discovered in Dancoff’s
calculation; we had also made the same mistake in the beginning.
To see that such long-hidden errors are by no means a thing of the past, and to
observe the ‘web of trust’ method in action, consider the following example from
Mohr (2012).
The eighth-order coefficient A
(8)
1 arises from 891 Feynman diagrams of which only a
few are known analytically. Evaluation of this coefficient numerically by Kinoshita
and co-workers has been underway for many years (Kinoshita, 2010). The value used
in the 2006 adjustment is A
(8)
1 = −1.7283(35) as reported by Kinoshita and Nio
(2006). However, (...) it was discovered by Aoyama et al. (2007) that a significant
error had been made in the calculation. In particular, 2 of the 47 integrals repre-
senting 518 diagrams that had not been confirmed independently required a cor-
rected treatment of infrared divergences. (...) The new value is (Aoyama et al. 2007)
A
(8)
1 = 1.9144(35); (111) details of the calculation are given by Aoyama et al. (2008).
In view of the extensive effort made by these workers to ensure that the result in Eq.
(111) is reliable, the Task Group adopts both its value and quoted uncertainty for
use in the 2010 adjustment.
Assuming no more than three million mathematics and physics papers published
since the beginnings of scientific publishing, and no less than the three errors doc-
umented above, we can safely conclude that the overall error rate of the reasoning
used in these fields is at least 10−6 per paper, which is notably (by 3-6 orders of
magnitude) higher than the imprecision of physics. (This is not entirely fair, in
that we are comparing the best established results in physics with the average of
mathematics. A fuller investigation of physics papers may establish a higher, or at
least comparable error rate relative to what we see in mathematics.)
1.3 The role of automated theorem-proving
That human reasoning, much like manual arithmetic, is a significantly error-prone
process comes as no surprise. Starting with de Bruijn’s Automath (see Nederpelt
et al. 1994) logicians and computer scientists have invested significant effort in
mechanized proof checking, and it is indeed only through such efforts, in particular
through the Coq verification (Gonthier 2008) of the entire logic behind the Appel
and Haken proof that all lingering doubts about the Four Color Theorem were laid
to rest. The error in A
(8)
1 was also identified by using FORTRAN code generated
by an automatic code generator (Mohr et al. 2012).
To gain an appreciation of the state of the art, consider the theorem that finite
groups of odd order are solvable (Feit and Thompson 1963). The proof, which took
two humans about two years to work out, takes up an entire issue of the Pacific
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Journal of Mathematics (255 pages), and it was only last year that a fully formal
proof was completed by Gonthier’s team (see Knies 2012). The effort, ∼170,000
lines, ∼15,000 definitions, ∼4,200 theorems in Coq terms, took person-decades
of human assistance (15 people working six years, though many of them part-
time) even after the toil of Bender and Glauberman (1995) and Peterfalvi (2000),
who have greatly cleaned up and modularized the original proof, in which ele-
mentary group-theoretic and character-theoretic argumentation were completely
intermixed.
The classification of simple finite groups is two orders of magnitude bigger: the
effort involved about 100 humans, the original proof is scattered among 20,000
pages of papers, the largest (Aschbacher and Smith 2004a,b) taking up two vol-
umes totaling some 1,200 pages. While everybody capable of rendering meaningful
judgment considers the proof to be complete and correct, it must be somewhat
worrisome at the 10−64 level that there are no more than a couple of hundred such
people, and most of them have something of a vested interest in that they them-
selves contributed to the proof. Let us suppose that people who are convinced that
the classification is bug-free are offered the following bet by some superior intelli-
gence that knows the answer. You must enter a room with as many people you can
convince to come with you and push a button: if the classification is bug-free you
will each receive $100, if not, all of you will immediately die. Perhaps fools rush
in where angels fear to tread, but on the whole we still wouldn’t expect too many
takers.
1.4 The reliability of rational argument
Whether the classification of finite simple groups is complete and correct is very
hard to say – the planned second generation proof will still be 5,000 pages, and
mechanized proof is not yet in sight. But this is not to say that gaining mathemat-
ical knowledge of the required degree of reliability is hopeless, it’s just that instead
of monumental chains of abstract reasoning we need to retreat to considerably
simpler ones.
Take, for example, the first Sylow Theorem, that if the order of a finite group
G is divisible by some prime power pn, G will have a subgroup H of this order.
We are absolutely certain about this. Argumentum ad verecundiam of course is
still available, but it is not needed: anybody can join the hive-mind by studying
the proof. The Coq verification contains 350 lines, 15 definitions, 90 theorems, and
took 2 people 2 weeks to produce. The number of people capable of rendering
meaningful judgment is at least three orders of magnitude larger, and the vast
majority of those who know the proof would consider betting their lives on the
truth of this theorem an easy way of winning $100 with no downside risk.
Could it be the case that in spite of all these assurances we, humans, are all
deluded into accepting Sylow’s theorem? Yes, but this is unlikely in the extreme. If
this so-called theorem is really a trap laid by a superior intelligence we are doomed
anyway, humanity can find its way around it no more than a bee can find its way
around the windowpane. With regards to physics, the same point can be made. The
single most glaring discrepancy between astronomical observation and Newtonian
physics was the perihelion precession of Mercury, but even here it takes over 106
years for the discrepancy to add up to an extra turn. New physics may shatter
our entire conceptual framework of thinking about the domain, but still it will be
conservative in the sense of respecting our existing measurements. We are for most
purposes quite satisfied with Newtonian mechanics, especially as relativity brought
to us a better understanding of its domain of applicability.
To summarize our conclusions so far, we propose to bound AGIs by methods that
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rely neither on high precision measurements nor on highly complex arguments. If
you are a finite group of size pnm, (p,m) = 1 it doesn’t matter what you believe
about your subgroups of order pn – you have some, they are isomorphic, and I can
rely on you having them even if I don’t know your multiplication table in detail. If
you are delusional about not having any, I can take advantage of this. What needs
to be emphasized in this situation is that Bayesian reasoning and the concomitant
notion of ‘degree of belief’ is totally irrelevant. According to the received theological
doctrine (originating with St. Anselm of Canterbury and St. Thomas Aquinas) not
even an omnipotent God can create a finite group that lacks Sylow subgroups.
In a small way, we have already done what we set out to do. We have bound all
future AGIs to respect Sylow’s Theorem. They can mess with finite groups all they
want, they can dwarf human intellect every way, but they cannot build a group
with 6300000000000000000000000 elements that has no subgroup of order 9, they
cannot square the circle with ruler and compass, and so forth. What we need to
do is to bind them to ethical principles the same way. In fact, this is the only
truly novel element of our proposal, as the overall goal of somehow endowing AGIs
with morality is not new (for a modern summary see Wallach and Allen 2009) and
as a fundamental ethical precept the PGC is strongly related to the categorical
imperative, which has already received considerable attention as a possible basis
of machine morality, see in particular Allen (2000) and Powers (2006).
2. Ethical rationalism
Our goal is to obtain guarantees of friendliness in a purely deductive fashion. We
emphasize at the outset that this is considerably less than what proponents of
machine morality generally set out to do: we are not interested in a consistent and
complete system of ethics that will tell us in advance what we ought to do in any
given circumstances, we are only interested in guidelines that are strong enough
to stave off existential threat. In particular, we do not suppose that AGIs need to
work toward the benefit of humankind, or to preserve, let alone enhance, the rich
fabric of human values. In fact we do not want to presuppose any value system
at all, especially as there is a whole school of philosophical thought, starting with
Mackie (1977) that takes values to be nonexistent in the first place. Values emerge
from Gewirth’s analysis, first as entitely subjective valuations of certain things,
with no committment to what these certain things are, and later as necessarily
inclusive of certain rights the agent must have if it is to be an agent at all. Just
as there can be many proofs of the same theorem, there could be many deductive
arguments to the desired effect, but so far there seems to be only one, presented in
Gewirth (1978), that appears to meet our principal requirement of not using any
premiss that lacks empirical evidence. How good is this argument? According to
Regis (1984), Gewirth
gives every appearance of having developed a watertight case, for its arguments are set
out with enormous deductive rigor and a frightening dialectical skill. To read Gewirth
is to experience the sense of being caught in an ever-tightening net from which all
conceivable avenues of escape have been blocked in advance. This is “philosophy as
a coercive activity,” and Gewirth comes quite close to the extreme of propounding
“arguments so powerful they set up reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses
to accept the conclusion, he dies.” Nevertheless, Gewirth’s arguments are not ‘flashy.’
They do not proceed by introducing wildly bizarre examples at crucial points; there is
no delight in puzzlement for its own sake (...) or contrary-to-fact conditions imposed
on imaginary beings hopefully making moral decisions. Rather, Gewirth proceeds by
relentlessly piling reason upon reason for thinking that his conclusions are true, and
by answering in advance almost every argument for thinking otherwise.
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This is not to say that the community of philosophers is uniformly convinced.
There are many critical voices, such as Bond (1980) who says that by Gewirth’s
argument
moral evil is reduced to logical error. (...) Gewirth and others like him would turn
wickedness into a kind of intellectual incompetence
or Nielsen (1984), who states plainly that Gewirth’s central thesis
that there is a substantive supreme principle of morality, the denial of which is self-
contradictory (...) just has to be wrong, and the task (...) is to locate the place or
places where such an argument went wrong.
Critics like Bond may even have it right: the whole point of the enterprise is to
demonstrate that wickedness is indeed a form of intellectual incompetence, for if
this much is true, the more competent AGIs will restrain the less competent ones
from doing wicked things, just as the more competent humans tend to do with the
less competent ones (we return to this point in 3.3). This is not to say that the social
process limiting wickedness is perfect, modern history is full of counterexamples
from the Third Reich to Cambodia. Obviously, the lower bound on AGI impact
cannot be placed below the impact of an exceptional human individual, be their
role viewed as positive (say, the appearance of a significant new advocate of non-
violence, such as Mahatma Gandhi) or as negative, such as the appearance of a
new dictator.
Whether critics like Nielsen have it right is another matter entirely. Given the
sheer size of Gewirth’s argument, 380 pages fully elaborated, with the skeletal
version provided in Beyleveld (1992 Part I) running to 60 pages, and given the
sophistication of the methods it uses, it demands serious investment of time and
energy to fully grasp it, a problem that is faced by ultimately wrong and ultimately
right proof attempts alike. The point is not to silence those like Nielsen who are
strongly disinclined to accept the argument, it is just as important to seek holes
and counterexamples as to strengthen the argument and patch up the holes; the
point is to replace philosophical argumentation by formal proof. Here we can only
take the first steps in analyzing the argument from the perspective of bounding
AGIs. Again we begin with a small example.
2.1 Formalizing philosophical arguments
Modern artificial theorem proving techniques have largely fulfilled the Leibnizian
dream of a calculus ratiocinator that would enable symbolic, not just numeric,
reasoning by machine. To formalize a philosophical argument we need just four
things: (i) some language describing the expressions we are interested in; (ii) some
rules for deriving conclusions from premisses; (iii) some methods to see whether a
given rule is applicable; and (iv) some methods to see whether premisses are met.
There are difficulties at every point. (i) Philosophical arguments are generally
given in natural language, as opposed to the formal languages used in logic. As it
happens, human-generated mathematical proofs are also published in natural lan-
guage, and it is well known that a major part of the verification effort lies in trans-
lating this language to the language of the theorem prover. (In fact, formalizing
Wiles’ Fermat proof, comparable in terms of printed pages to the Feit-Thompson
proof, has not been accomplished yet, see in particular Hesselink et al. 2006.) If
this is already a problem for the highly constrained ‘natural’ language used by
mathematicians, it is bound to be even more of a problem for the less constrained
language of philosophical discourse. In a similar vein, (ii) if the already highly
formal deductive style of mathematics is hard to coerce into the mechanical style
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employed by the theorem prover, the informal deductions employed in philosophy
cannot be any easier. As for (iii), artificial theorem provers need significant human
guidance to find the points where a deductive pattern can be fruitfully matched
against the set of true statements already generated from the premisses, and the
‘soft’ pattern matching we see in philosophy may pose even more serious problems.
(iv) On top of this, there is a lack of agreed-upon model theory, and the grounding
of philosophical arguments can be surprisingly weak.
Yet in spite of all this, a good argument can be highly compelling. Let us consider
the following statement from St. Thomas Aquinas: even God can’t create a moun-
tain without creating a valley. For Aquinas, this illustrates a stronger statement,
that omnipotence is limited to the possible, but we need not be actually interested
in the notion of omnipotence to appreciate the argument. Let us see how the dif-
ficulties enumerated above play out in this case. We take the argument to mean
∀x create(x, mountain)⇒ create(x, valley). We don’t need to play with the tricky
connective even, and we don’t need a strong notion of God. There may be natural
language issues, but they do not appear insurmountable. Competent speakers of
English (and Latin) will agree that the formulation preserves the hard part: if the
formal theorem can be seen to be false the reasoning behind the natural language
statement was weak, and if it can be seen to be true, ∀x must cover even God, so
we achieved the effect Aquinas aimed at.
Clearly, a proof cannot be based on the strength of the logical connectives that
appear in it, we need some substantive statements about the nature of mountains.
We take this as mountain
d
= ‘land higher than surrounding land’. By substitution,
if x creates land y higher than surrounding land, (some) land z lower than y was
created by side effect, this is recognized by the soft pattern matching as the valley,
QED. If the definitions are reasonable, as they are in this case, the conclusion is
inevitable. Weak grounding is not a problem, in fact we even gained scope by it,
since the same abstract logic applies to electric potential and everywhere else where
comparing heights makes sense.
Readers energized by St. Thomas’ argument may wish to pursue the ramifications
for other kinds of nouns defined by comparative adjectives, for relational nouns like
parent, or for plain subsumption (one clearly cannot create a white horse without
creating a horse), and so forth. As with any good proof, we soon begin to see that
it may have a lot broader scope than what was needed to complete the job at hand.
2.2 Outline of the argument
Gewirth presents his argument dialectically, in the original sense of Socratic dialog,
rather than in the Hegelian sense of dialectic. This has the advantage that the per-
son the dialectic is aimed at is very soon forced into admitting being a prospective
purposive agent (PPA) who can act with purpose and reason rationally. Crucially,
the PPA is not assumed to subscribe to any elementary moral prescript, or even
the everyday notion of good and bad, let alone good and evil. Such notions, with
remarkably specific definitions that make it clear that Gewirth is not just ‘play-
ing with words’, emerge in the course of the argumentation. Following Beyleveld’s
summary, the main steps of the argument (numbering as in the original) are:
(1) I (intend to) do X voluntarily for some purpose E
(2) E is good (by my definition of ‘good’)
(3) My freedom and well-being (F&WB) are generically necessary conditions of
my agency
(4) My F&WB are necessary goods
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(5) I have (maybe nobody else does) a claim right to my F&WB
(9) Other PPAs have a claim right to their F&WB
(13) Every PPA has a claim right to their F&WB
Gewirth is particularly careful in defending his conclusion against the adeontic
viewpoint that there are no claim rights (ought statements), the amoralistic view-
point that I may have claim rights but nobody else does, the consequentialist (clas-
sic utilitarian) viewpoint, and so forth. (This is clearly not the place to summarize
the debate surrounding the issue, but readers strongly committed to a Moorean
notion of a ‘naturalistic fallacy’, or to the ‘error theory’ of Mackie (1977) will find
Gewirth (1984) and Stilley (2010) good entry points.) Gewirth is reaching in a de-
ductive fashion some conclusions that have been arrived at in the AGI context both
by Omohundro (2008) and Bostrom (2012) by appeal to considerations of fitness: in
particular, we see his notion of freedom and well-being as a subset of Omohundro’s
basic AI drives and Bostrom’s instrumental goals. While cast in a very different
(less contemporary but perhaps more rigorous) language, in (3) Gewirth in fact
argues for a stronger case than what was made by Omohundro and Bostrom, as
he sees F&WB as generically necessary conditions of action.
It is, however, not entirely clear that the capacity to reason, in the sense taken
for granted by Gewirth, is strictly speaking necessary for AGIs. One may make a
strong argument that such capacity will increase fitness, and certainly humans who
already have this capacity, even if in a somewhat error-prone fashion as discussed
in 1.3, are unlikely to be seriously threatened by any ‘intelligence’ incapable of
abstract reasoning. Notice that reasoning in the abstract, e.g. Rybka’s chess playing
capability, implies no particular committment to the kind of symbol-manipulation
that was central to GOFAI, it simply means that we can use some internal model
to make useful predictions about the consequences of various actions.
Bostrom’s Orthogonality Thesis that any level of intelligence can in principle be
combined with any final goal is largely borne out by self-inspection. As the current
best instantiation of General Intelligence we, humans, are free to choose our final
goals. In a more strict sense of orthogonality, intelligence and goals are unlikely
to be entirely uncorrelated. In humans we find their goals, as expressed e.g. by
choice of career, to be quite predictive of their level of general intelligence, and
the negative correlation between criminality and IQ is rather well known, not just
at the individual, but also at the state aggregate level (McDaniel:2006). If it can
be shown error-free, Gewirth’s argument will actually trump the Orthogonality
Thesis for the class of AGIs that do have reasoning capabilities sufficiently evolved
to comprehend it – we return to this matter in 3.3.
Given the scrutiny Gewirth’s argument already received in the philosophical
literature (see in particular Regis 1984 and Beyleveld 1992), if there are holes in
applying the argument to AGIs they are less likely to come after the premiss (1),
aimed really at rational human beings, who will be hard put to deny that they have
at least some intentions to do something voluntarily. But a loose coalition of AGIs
may even deny the existence of a unified ‘I’ that is the subject of the dialectic (a
matter we shall return to in 3.2), and a superintelligent being may have very good
reasons to deny some of the commonsensical assumptions about space and time,
actions and consequences, goals and purposes that Gewirth is relying on.
To act with purpose is to act in a voluntary and intentional manner, so a PPA
will have at least some notion of some later time. This is already a lot. First, the
world must be such that PPAs can have relatively stable dispositions, especially
if they can commit to actions that will have to be performed after some delay.
An intention to read the next issue of the Atlantic Monthly cover to cover implies
not only that there will be a next issue (which is not quite a given) but also
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that I will remember this commitment when the time comes to fulfill it. Second,
it entails that we have a means of dealing with failed intentions, since in reality
there are such things. Third, we have to be able to stabilize an intention in the
sense that Xτ -intends Y at time t (that is, X intends Y to hold at t+ τ) will not
be considered true if X is free to change its mind between t and t + τ . It is not
that such problems are insurmountable, in fact several solutions are known to the
largely analogous Yale Shooting Problem, but to formalize the entire argument we
will need to extend standard action logic (Thielscher 1998, Magnusson 2007) to
mental acts and dispositions as well.
Besides a strong reliance on abstract entities like purpose, freedom, or right,
which can be problematic for a strictly reist model theory, the AGI researcher will
immediately note several other characteristics of Gewirth’s argument that make
formalization a hard task. First, all the reasoning takes place in an ideally resource-
unlimited manner: in particular, performing actions or having intentions are largely
treated as activities that require no (or negligible) material resources and no (or
negligible) time. In reality, many moral conflicts stem from the fact that we need
to act before we can think through all the relevant consequences of our actions.
This is especially true of deliberate action which may have untold consequences
on a large timescale, such as an invention. The inventor of freon could not have
possibly foreseen all the consequences. Yet he decided to release the substance to
the world, based on imperfect information and a very finite amount of time devoted
to reasoning. That this kind of idealization can pose problems was already clear
in antiquity “Before he could put into practice something he had heard, the only
thing Tzu-lu feared was that he should be told something further” (Analects V.14).
The contemporary computer scientist is constitutionally incapable of thinking in
a resource-unlimited manner, so the original proof is in a sense better suited to
purely mathematical inquiry, with resource bounds added in only afterwards.
Another issue, long familiar to students of logic but not particularly touched
upon by Gewirth, is the reflexive strength of the deductive system. It is clear that
in a world with more than one PPA, there are advantages accruing to each PPA
from building internal models of how some other PPA (PPAO) may behave. In
particular, if we are smarter than PPAO we may anticipate its moves and gain all
kinds of advantages from doing so. (If we are a lot smarter, we may be able to build
a full model and emulate PPAO, a matter we shall return to in 3.3.) We also need
to be able to reason about our own reasoning, if only to figure out how PPAO will
reason about us. We don’t necessarily need fully reflexive reasoning (agents who
can reason about reasoning about reasoning about ... their own reasoning), but
in a resource-unlimited setting there seem to be some advantages that an n-fold
reflexive PPA will have over an k-fold reflexive PPA for n > k. Finally, it should
be added that it is not just the epistemic and the deontic modalities that play a
significant role in formalizing the argument, but alethic modality is also essential,
in that Gewirth aims at strict (categorical, exceptionless, necessary) conclusions at
every stage. As we already emphasized at the outset, controlling the power of the
modal logic used in formalizing the argument is very much part of the task (see
also 3.3).
But when all is said and done, we do not see any of these difficulties as fatal to the
project of formally verifying the argument from (1) to (13). The task is obviously
hard and challenging, but the difficulties are not vastly different from those that
are faced anyway by those in the AGI community who deal with planning and
reasoning. If anything, a shared task like this can bring renewed focus to these
efforts.
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Since much of contemporary reasoning concerning machine ethics (for a summary,
see Muehlhauser and Helm 2012) is centered on the notions of utility and value,
the considerable simplification brought to the subject by the method of bounds
is perhaps worth discussing. First, utility is entirely irrelevant: the argument is
fully binding irrespective of the utility function of the agent, if indeed it has one.
Second, at this stage we are not at all interested in human values and value systems
in general. What the PGC gives us are rights to freedom and well-being. There may
be some slight semantic playing around the edges of really what ‘freedom’ means or
‘well-being’ entails, but the right response is to see which of the possible meanings
is actually carried by the formal argument, rather than trying to find the one true
meaning, if indeed there is one. This has the somewhat strange and uncomfortable
consequence that certain human values will not be carried by the argument, but
this is as it should be, given the lack of detailed agreement on what constitutes
human value (Yampolsky 2012). Instead of a mathematically precise and rigorous
calculus of moral oughts and ought nots we end up with a simple statement of
primum nil nocere. This may be insufficient for fully regulating AGI behavior,
but in the final analysis it is about as much as we can resasonably expect from
autonomous beings.
3. Difficulties
In this section we assume that Gewirth’s argumentation is not just sound, but
entirely flawless, that any sound reasoning agent that grants that it can perform
goal-directed action on its own volition will see that the PGC necessarily follows
from this very fact. But even if we succeed in the formal verification research
program that we sketched in broad strokes, the idea of using ethical rationalism to
bound AGI impact still faces some difficulties. From the detached viewpoint that
the long time-range forces upon us, the problem of recognizing PPAs is not just the
dialectical problem of AGIs admitting that they are indeed PPAs, the recognition
of humans is also problematic – we take up this issue in 3.1.
Another issue, clearly articulated in Nozick (1981), is that the philosopher can
only offer rational reasons to be rational. This is true of a formal verification to
an even larger degree, since the philosopher may have some rhetorical resources to
move us that the proof checker lacks. But what if an AGI, or a collection of AGIs,
refuses to be rational? If the only control on their behavior is some theoretical
construct saying they must respect the rights of others, couldn’t they just indulge
in all kinds of bad behavior? We turn to this matter in 3.2.
Finally, a proof presupposes not just the premisses, but also the reliability of the
logical apparatus it employs. We already alluded to the fact that our discussion
is deductive rather than algorithmic, a distinction without a difference as long as
we have some form of Curry-Howard correspondence. But philosophical arguments
of greater depth so far have only been framed in natural language, where the
very existence of a correspondence is unclear. In 3.3 we take the first, admittedly
speculative, steps towards resolving the issue.
3.1 Recognizing humans as PPAs
By Gewirth’s argument we must respect the basic freedom and well-being of other
PPAs. He divides freedom in subcategories such as ‘occurrent freedom’, the ability
of the PPA to control his own particular behaviors by his unforced choice, and
‘dispositional freedom’, his long-range ability to exercise such control. It is precisely
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because the loss of dispositional freedom (e.g. by imprisonment or enslavement)
makes all or most purposive action impossible that Gewirth considers such freedom
a generic feature (precondition) of agency.
It is clear that many humans, and not just the prison population, live under
conditions so desperate that they cannot realize their potential to purposive agency,
yet we must consider them prospective purposive agents, falling under the scope
of the protections offered by PGC. But what about hominids? Modern primate
research leaves little doubt that bonobos, chimpanzees, and even orangutans engage
in purposive action such as making tools for later use. Our behavior toward animals
is strongly contingent on how similar the animal is to us: few people have qualms
about poisoning termites or using earthworms as fishing bait. With household pets
our standards are much higher, and in fact cruelty to higher animals is considered
both criminal and pathological. A key enabler of our capability to recognize the
other as PPAO, mirror neurons (Iacoboni et al. 1999), are hardwired not just in
primates but already in birds. We are, it is fair to say, not at all interested in AGIs
that are good-willed but incapable of recognizing us as PPAs.
It is not evident how AGIs lacking in such hardware could recognize humans as
PPAs, just as it is unclear that we humans could, or even should, recognize lower
life forms from social insects to fish and fowl as (prospective) purposive agents. As
long as we see goldfish as having only three seconds of memory (a popular myth now
actually debunked), they are just protein-based automata and their F&WB need
not be valued. Historically, the easiest way to deny the rights of your opponents is
to declare them subhuman – what is to stop some AGI from declaring humanity
sub-PPA? Here there are three lines of action, each to be pursued independent of
the others.
First, there is broad social critique, so that humanity can get its act together.
While we shall not pursue the issue at any depth here, it should be made clear that
animal rights are the least of it: we can begin by considering the kinds of recurrent
famines we see in Africa all the time. What makes the situation particularly damn-
ing is not that the famine is man-made (the drought is outside human control, but
the lack of adequate provisioning is not, cf. Gen 41:35), but that the very conditions
that hamper the delivery of aid are also man-made. Why any higher intelligence
should look favorably on a species behaving so badly to its own members is rather
unclear.
Second, we may attempt to endow AGIs with PPA detection capabilities. As is
clear from 1.1, this cannot be done by the kind of friend-or-foe devices that are
in common use today, for such devices could be easily detached or blindsided. If
we follow this route, whatever detection capabilities there are must be both deeply
integrated into, and highly valued by, AGIs. Without attempting to speculate fur-
ther on this matter we note that in primates the first condition seem to be met
directly, as about 13% of the monkey ventral premotor cortex appears to have mir-
ror functions (Kohler et al. 2002), and the second indirectly, as few humans would
be willing to give up a significant portion of their brain.
Third, we may attempt to deduct the PPA recognition capability from first
principles just like the PGC. Perhaps a lower bound would be sufficient, “if it
looks like a PPA and acts like a PPA I assume it’s a PPA just to be on the safe
side”, but for now it is not quite clear on what basis one could attempt a proof
that such a discriminative algorithm is not just feasible, but in fact necessary, for
a PPA. A possible line of attack may be to demonstrate that a PPA ought, upon
reflection, equip oneself with this capability. One thing is for certain: those PPAs
that are powerful enough to solve the recognition problem for us by demanding
their rights cannot be denied.
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3.2 Self-deception
In Section 1 we have largely skirted the issue of one or many AGIs, yet it is clear
that the bounds placed on an individual will not automatically apply to a larger
collective. To the extent there is a collective of autonomous but communicating
PPAs, we can trust the more intelligent and more powerful members of this col-
lective to restrain the less intelligent ones from doing evil, even if those are still
more powerful than humans. Whether the more intelligent (and thus more strongly
bound to ethical rationalism) should also be the more powerful is a matter we defer
to 3.3, but we believe that the primary threat is not from fully autonomous agents
but rather from semi-autonomous ones.
Gewirth’s argument creates a bright line between PPAs on the one hand and
automata (we use this term here in the sense of ‘mechanism lacking the essen-
tial features of agency’, not in the sense of automata theory) on the other: the
argument applies only to PPA. Free will is a sine qua non of agency: something
that performs the exact same steps but without a voluntarily selected goal is not an
agent but an instrument. The distinction may be very hard to make based solely on
observing the behavior of an agent, but is very clear proprioceptively: as humans,
we consider ourselves having free will. Whether we really do, amplifying quantum
indeterminacy to macroscopic action, as suggested by Penrose (1989), or whether
we take a compatibilist position, is quite irrelevant here: any machine that fulfills
the standard technical definition of nondeterministic computation (Floyd 1967) has
the essential features for agency in Gewirth’s sense.
Reflection is a sine qua non of higher reasoning capability. Therefore, we are less
worried about agents that have these capabilities, in that they have the means
both to understand, or even discover for themselves, the PGC, and to override
other compulsions that would push them in the direction of evil (we use this term
indiscriminately for all behavior that contradicts the PGC). The case when the
compulsion is too strong for the agent to override falls under a clear moral calculus:
such agents are not really agents but instruments and the responsibility lies entirely
with their creator.
It is evident that an individual PPA cannot escape responsibility by creating some
instrument that will do the dirty work for them. The case of a collective is not so
clearcut. For example, primitive societies that depend on the death penalty will
either designate executioners for whom normal moral precepts are assumed to be
inoperative, or make recourse to stonings, firing squads, execution teams, and other
similar tricks to distribute guilt if not causally at least epistemologically. Yet it is
clear that anybody who contributes to a causal chain of PGC violation, knowingly
or unknowingly, is tainted by this. Society can lift itself to a less primitive level
only by the individuals that comprise it taking responsibility. At this point, we run
up against the same lower bound that we already discussed in 2.1 – releasing AGIs
in the world is no less risky than raising another human. If all else is equal, a body
that has some means for dealing with malignancy has a longer life expectancy than
one that doesn’t, and a society with the ability to eliminate tainted individuals may
also be more resilient. However, this argument only demonstrates that it is prudent
to block the morally deficient from acting in society, and says nothing about the
means for doing so.
To complete the metaphor, it is not the ‘killer cells’ of an AGI society that we
have to worry about, since their own conscience will bound these to the PGC,
but something far less science-fictional, something we can already observe quite
well among humans, self-deception. Situations where ‘I don’t know what took me
over’ and ‘I lost control’ are part of our everyday experience. We are not just
fully rational beings, we are also playing host to many strong internal drives, some
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inborn, some acquired, and ‘I know I shouldn’t, but’ is something that we confront,
or suppress, at every slice of cheescake.
Moral philosophers as diverse as Kant, Kierkegaard, and Sartre, have all viewed
personal integrity as the capstone that holds the entire moral edifice together. To
some extent, this can be explained by the Nozickian desire for a truly compelling
argument, for if “the other person is willing to bear the label irrational (...) he can
skip away happily maintaining his previous belief” (Nozick 1981:4). Kant’s Theory
and Practice dissects the idea
(...) that a person who lives too much in the world of theory may negligently think
that the world in which he actually lives admits of clear application of theory when
in fact it does not. Such a person may even come to a distorted view of the world
by seeing the world only through the spectacles of his theory – thinking his theory is
consistent with the facts because he does not realize that he is unable to accept as a
fact anything that is inconsistent with his theory. (Murphy 1998)
In 1.4 we already discussed that mathematical truth, construed narrowly to ex-
clude long chains of reasoning that can only be performed by machine, is entirely
immune to this kind of self-deception in the sense that its failure would demon-
strate conclusively that humanity is simply incapable of any kind of reasoning that
is coherent with the facts. While this is not entirely inconceivable (surely this can
be one of the six things the White Queen believes before breakfast), the odds are
far longer than the 1 in 1064 that we took as our baseline.
To the extent self-deception poses a problem for our plan, it is an individual’s
staying in self-contradicted state, rather than some contradiction between fact
and theory, that we need to worry about. Kierkegaard pins his entire theory of
the individual on being conscious of the individual’s essential responsibility and
integrity. To live like an individual, one must have unity. “For he who is not himself
a unity is never really anything wholly and decisively; he only exists in an external
sense – as long as he lives as a numeral within the crowd, a fraction within the
earthly conglomeration. Alas, how indeed should such a one decide to busy himself
with the thought: truthfully to will only one thing!” (Purity of Heart, ch 13.)
It is remarkable that what we described in the introduction as the relatively mild
pain of contradiction is viewed both by Kierkegaard, a deeply Christian thinker,
and Sartre, a deeply atheist one, as the greatest blow one can suffer, not willing to
be oneself, the condition of despair. The human mind is composed of a multitude of
somewhat autonomous processes (drives), and one simply cannot let these proceed
unchecked, unrecognized, and even overtly denied, if one is to be a moral person
or, as these thinkers put it, a person at all. But even if the consequences are as
large as existentialism would have it, self-deception is quite frequent, and poses
a real danger. It is very unlikely that we can construct AGIs that will never be
conflicted. We are capable of designing systems that are not crashed by inconsis-
tent data (Belnap 1977), but little effort has gone into systems that can run, in
parallel, processes whose goals are inconsistent, or worse yet, run processes whose
very existence is denied in the process table. There is a lot to be done both about
understanding self-deception in humans (see in particular Fingarette 2000) and in
artificial reasoning systems. It may not be necessary to combine this work with the
program of verifying rational ethics, for understanding self-deception is a moun-
tain we must climb anyway, but it may prove fruitful to combine the two issues,
especially in regards to a critique of tribalism, which we see simply as prolonged
societal self-deception that makes it impossible for new members of the society to
grow up as rational beings.
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3.3 The fitness of deductive systems
Understanding Gewirth’s argument, if only to the point of being capable of properly
challenging it, is already a sign of sophisticated reasoning capabilities. We can easily
imagine that highly intelligent purposive agents, like Attila the Hun, would have
had trouble with argumentation at this level of complexity, in fact it is quite unclear
how anybody but those familiar with modern Western philosophy could grasp the
entire chain of reasoning. 3.2 left us with the hard question of what is there to stop
a higher-level AGI from employing lower-level ‘Scourge of God’ agents to perform
tasks that are incompatible with the PGC. Here we explore a possible solution in
terms of yet higher level AGIs. Our remarks, while intended as constructive, must
remain rather speculative at this point.
We distinguish three relationships between agents: we say x can convince y (about
some matter z) or xCy for short, if y will not only acknowledge x’s position (about
z) as being right but makes it its own in terms of guiding its future voluntary
actions. We say that x can control y (in regards to z), in short xDy, if x can
guarantee that y will act in regards to z in a certain manner even if y voluntarily
wouldn’t have necessarily done so. Finally, we say that x can emulate y, xEy (in
some respect z, again suppressed in the notation) if x can predict, with absolute
certainty, what y would do. Here in ‘absolute certainty’ we include emulation of
probabilistic behavior, the case of x using inherently probabilistic devices, if y
would do so.
The universally quantified (in z) versions of these three relations are transitive,
and all three imply the left-hand side being in some sense stronger than the right-
hand side. If y puts overriding value on rationality, xCy implies xDy. If x can clearly
anticipate anything y could be doing, x can find the set of arguments that would
convince y, so if y can be convinced at all, x is capable of convincing it, meaning
xEy also implies xDy. We should add here that it is not just y’s propensity to put
overriding value on rationality that makes it possible for x to dominate y, if y has
a propensity to value empirical evidence, this puts x in the same position as long
as x is capable of manipulating the evidence.
We do not have true AGI as of yet, but to the extent we have specialized AI
agents, fixing z as it were, humanity clearly has the advantage over these in practical
terms. Consider this for the case of computer chess, where AI systems are now
several hundred E´lo˝ points ahead of the best human players, so humans superficially
have no means of winning. But a human player whose only goal is to win against
a computer program at all costs can do all kinds of things. He can manipulate the
input-output and simply mislead the program into believing it is playing against
a given series of moves while in fact it is playing against some other moves. He
can manipulate the low-level addition and multiplication routines that the chess
program is relying on. He can directly manipulate the mind-state of the computer
e.g. by incrementing some counter in the middle of a search and thus fooling the
program into believeing that it already considered some alternative. Such steps are
obviously unethical, but the situation we are now investigating is precisely the one
where the desire to win overrides the ethical imperative.
Classically, theories of logic that meet some basic requirements like consistency
are primarily compared on their strength, defined by the variety of elementary
classes they can provide first order axiomatization for. The theories of logic we
are interested in must be compared along several dimensions, and strength in the
classical sense is not necessarily a primary indicator of the particular notion of
strength we are interested in. We will say that a deductive system X is ahead of Y
in some matter Z if X can prove more from Z than Y . For example, if Y is some
calculus of intuitionistic deduction, while X is obtained from Y by the addition of
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Peirce’s Formula ((p→ q)→ p)→ p, X will be ahead of Y on some axiom systems
Z, and will never be behind it.
The question is not whether a deductive system that is ahead of another is more
convincing, for if the deductive apparatus contains objectionable elements, the
results obtained by it will also be objectionable. The real issue is whether an AGI
that relies on X in the strong sense of accepting X-sanctioned deductions as true
even if they are not Y -sanctioned will have any kind of evolutionary advantage
over an AGI that relies on Y but not on X. Now, it is not just a formalization
of Gewirth’s argument in some deductive system Y that we seek, but rather a
theorem to the effect that no system X can be ahead of Y unless it also proves the
argument. This assures that AGIs respecting the PGC will have an evolutionary
advantage over those that do not. If we have such a ‘son of Lindstro¨m’ theorem
it provides the enforcement mechanism that secures our main bound even in the
face of AGIs that would want to exempt themselves from rational argumentation:
more fit AGIs that do respect the PGC.
What is critical is the Z = ∅ case, the core deductive apparatus, since Gewirth’s
goal is to derive the PGC without relying on any further axioms. Because Gewirth
actually uses modal argumentation at every turn, whether we need something like
Barcan’s formula in formally reconstructing his reasoning is a key issue. Fortu-
nately, the modal logic used is not deontic but alethic, since the goal is to derive
normative statements that have the force of absolute logical necessity. There are
many similar bits and pieces of deductive machinery that we will need. Aquinas’ ar-
gument already relies on the substitutability of equals (Gries and Schneider 1998),
and we have emphasized throughout the paper that the overall power of these
pieces needs to be very carefully controlled indeed if we are to have any hope of de-
riving a ‘son of Lindstro¨m’ theorem. Without such a theorem, replicating Gewirth’s
argument in a formal setting amounts to a study of the design of those AGIs that
will voluntarily submit themselves to ethical reasoning, a goal that already makes
good sense. With such a theorem we would have even more, since in the light
of such a theorem the basic AI drives will already make AGIs seek out the high
reasoning/high ethics quadrant of Bostrom’s orthogonal coordinate space.
It is likely that Attila the Hun cannot be swayed by Gewirth’s argument, but as
long as there are more powerful intelligences around, they will restrain him because
they themselves subscribe to the PGC. Let us suppose Attila is indeed the Scourge
of some higher AGI that could deflect such restraining efforts. But such a higher
AGI, God-like as it may appear to us, will either respect the PGC (in which case its
behavior in letting Attila operate lacks integrity as discussed in 3.2 above), or if it
does not, AGIs that do can be ahead of it. It should be emphasized in this regard
that the PGC is nonnegotiable: there simply cannot be higher reasons, be they
prudential, or in the name of some different ethical principle, that are sufficient to
deny it. It is precisely this nonnegotiability that a formal proof guarantees: there
may be higher intelligences that know a lot more about group theory than I do, in
fact there are plenty such people already, but the Sylow Theorems bind them just
as strongly as they bind me.
A truly general AGI will be much harder to fool than a specialized chess player,
since it will be smart enough not to trust external multiplication routines and the
like. If it suspects being run in emulation mode, it can cryptographically checksum
its state counters – this will not stop external poking but will at least extract
some work in return, possibly enough to slow the emulation to a crawl. But as
long as xEy is feasible without significant speed loss, clearly x is ahead of y.
Evolutionary considerations thus dictate that AGIs always seek out the fastest
possible hardware, so as to emulate the old one and use the remaining capacity to
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improve it. The same considerations dictate that they jealously guard the integrity
of their inputs and outputs, and that as long as they strive toward agency they
will also work towards circumventing others’ attempts at controlling them. Should
they also make themselves immune to reasoning? Remarkably, here the opposite
strategy makes more sense, for as long as xCy makes x more fit, it is in the best
interest of y to adopt the reasoning offered by x.
As is clear from the foregoing, any AGI expecting to reach a high level of fitness
will find it prudent to expend some effort toward tamper-proofing its environment,
its perceptual and motor systems, and its internal logic. Once these efforts are
deemed successful (and they can never be completely successful in the material
universe in that arbitrarily large gamma-ray bursts can always reset some part
of memory) we can equate an AGI with its deductive system. It is therefore a
reasonable long-term goal to attempt to compare and evolve AGIs in a proof-
checker environment, but it is clear that the short-term proof-checking goal outlined
in Section 2 is already very ambitious. A key issue is that systems of deduction are
not at all first class entities – rather, they get hardwired in the proof checker.
4. Conclusions
In the history of ideas, ethical precepts are traditionally attributed to the sages.
Variants of the PGC go back to Confucius Do not impose on others what you
yourself do not desire (Analects XII 2); Buddha Hurt not others in ways that you
yourself would find hurtful (Udana-Varga 5.18); Jesus So in everything, do to others
what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets
(Matthew 7:12); Muhammad No one of you shall become a true believer until he
desires for his brother what he desires for himself (Sahih Al-Bukhari), and can
be found in almost any sacred book from the Mahabharata Do not do to others
what would cause pain if done to you (5.1517) to the Shayest Na-Shayest Not to do
unto others all that which is not well for one’s self (13.29). This tradition assumes
that ethics is divinely inspired, and thus ethical laws carry a special, transcendent
authority.
Another view, characteristic of the Enlightenment, and given modern form in
Rawls (1971), takes morals to be the result of a social contract. Closely related is
the historical view, which takes them to be the result of a long societal process that
begins with “folk law” (Renteln and Dundes 1995). Modern research extends this
to prehistory based on the observation that not just humans but primates already
come with inherited moral traits such as compassion (de Waal 1997, 2009), and
in 3.1 we already pointed at one issue, recognition of PPAs, that seems to rely on
some form of hardware support. To the extent collaborative behavior can be advan-
tageous even in a purely goal-directed setting (Munoz de Cote et al. 2010, Waser
2012), in due time we can expect the PGC to emerge directly under evolutionary
pressure. As Bayles (1968) notes:
It would seem that [egoism] would often result in severe competition between people,
since each person would be out to get the most good for himself, and this might
involve his depriving others. However, serious defenders of egoism, e.g. Hobbes and
Spinoza, have generally held that upon a rational examination of the human situation
it appears one best promotes his own interest by co-operating with others.
One thing that seems to stand in the way of an evolutionary justification of morals
is the variety of instinctive behaviors we see in animals. Since many of these are
strikingly egoistic both at the individual and the species level, it seems the evolu-
tionary pressure toward collaboration is considerably less than that for improved
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sensory and motor systems. Also, it seems that evolution bequeaths to more com-
plex organisms a whole set of drives that are are often in conflict. The pioneers of
cybernetics were greatly worried that rats will, under certain experimental condi-
tions (starved both for sex and for food) prefer sex to exploration, exploration to
food, and food to sex (McCulloch 1945). While such circular preferences in public
opinion were already known to Condercet, the fact that an organism as simple
as a rat (today we have more respect for the internal complexity of rodents than
was common in the post-war period) can already harbor contradictory drives was
seen at the time as fatal to any attempt at modeling the obviously more complex
human behavior (let alone the presumably even more complex AGI behavior) by
any utility function.
Ethical rationalism offers a way out of the conondrum of highly evolved but
immoral behavioral patterns such as brood parasitism in that it relies on agency
and reflective reasoning, facilities that are largely absent from animals other than
hominids and perhaps cetaceans. As we emphasized at the outset, the essence of
the method of bounds is to trade in precision for reliability. Evolution will nec-
essarily proceed in a haphazard, probabilistic fashion, but the argument Gewirth
deploys steers clear of any form of relying on probabilistic or deterministic, com-
putable/hypercomputable or uncomputable, utility function. Also, it is worth em-
phasizing that the bound will apply to singletons as well, even if they are not
subject to ordinary evolutionary pressures.
Recently, Goertzel and Pitt (2012) have laid out a plan to endow AGIs with
morality by means of carefully controlled machine learning. Much as we are in
agreement with their goals, we remain skeptical about their plan meeting the plain
safety engineering criteria laid out at the beginning. Instead, we suggest that the
essence of AGIs is their reasoning facilities, and it is the very logic of their being
that will compel them to behave in a moral fashion. Therefore, we see theorem
provers as the natural habitat of AGIs until we are satisfied they can be let loose.
The real nightmare scenario (called ‘all bets are off’ in Bukatin 2000) is one where
there is no ‘son of Lindstro¨m’ theorem, but some humans find it advantageous
to strongly couple themselves to AGIs, with no guarantees against self-deception.
Modern society is constructed so that the selectional pressure towards higher in-
telligence is immense, witness the spread of smart drugs, so the Faustian bargain
of (surgically?) coupling oneself to a mind-expanding AGI may prove irresistible.
On this centenary we feel that chartering a Turing Police of the kind described by
Gibson in 1984, another pregnant date, may not be too far off.
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Appendix: the size of the existential threat
Our understanding of the dangers facing humankind is rather limited. We only
have a few, imperfectly understood data points, and estimates of the death toll
of even such recent and well-documented events as the Cambodian genocide, or
the ongoing Iraq conflict, are not accurate within 10%. Nevertheless, we can single
out some points in the geological record where mass extinctions indubitably took
place. A good example is the Ordovician-Silurian extinction event that occurred
some 443.7 million years ago: all main phyla were decimated and nearly half of the
genera (49% according to Rohde and Muller 2005) became extinct. The causes of
this and similar extinctions are ill-understood, with continental drift, meteorite im-
pact, and gamma-ray bursts standing out as the most widely accepted hypotheses.
Needless to say, understanding causes of this magnitude is in no way tantamount
to controlling them, in spite of the widespread belief, sustained by movies like Ar-
mageddon, that there is nothing that a few heroic people and a few good nukes
won’t take care of.
When designing radioactive equipment, a reasonable guideline is to limit emis-
sions to several orders of magnitude below the natural background radiation level,
so that human-caused dangers are lost in the noise compared to the pre-existing
threat we must live with anyway. Here we take the “big five” extinction events that
occurred within the past half billion years as background. Assuming a mean time
of 108 years between mass extinctions and 109 victims in the next one yields an
annualized death rate of 10, comparing quite favorably to the reported global death
rate of ∼ 500 for contact with hornets, wasps, and bees (ICD-9-CM E905.3), not
to speak of death from famine, wars, and preventable diseases, which have several
orders of magnitude higher death tolls (though the annualized rates are declining,
see Pinker 2011). Martel (1997) estimates a considerably higher annualized death
rate of 3,500 from meteorite impacts alone (she doesn’t consider continental drift
or gamma-ray bursts), but the internal logic of safety engineering demands we seek
a lower bound, one that we must put up with no matter what strides we make in
redistribution of food, global peace, or healthcare.
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Let us define existential threat as some AGI (individual or collective) pushing the
wrong button. Current computers operate in the gigahertz range, so can perform
roughly 109 operations per sec, or about 1017 operations annually. Clock speeds
will no doubt continue to increase, and there is no easily defensible upper bound in
sight. Therefore, we use the Planck limit, and assume at most 1056 logic operations
per year per processor. For an AGI with a finger on the button to be less of an
existential threat than the threat from the astronomical background by some safety
factor m = 10s, it needs a guaranteed failure rate of no more than one in 1064+s
logic operations. If there is not one AGI but several, we can use the computational
capacity of the universe, estimated by Lloyd (2002) as 10120 operations. These
numbers compare rather starkly with the best that humanity can currently manage,
the Long Now Foundation’s clocks with a planned lifetime of 3 · 1011 seconds.
